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Contradictions of left-wing *hispanismo*: The case of Spanish Republicans in exile[1]

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Introduction

Despite the deep ideological differences that have divided the community of Spanish-speaking intellectuals over the past 130 years or so, most of them seem to have agreed on two points – that, due to the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon North, the cultural and historical accomplishments of Spain and its former colonies have never received the credit they deserve, and that something needs to be done about this. At various moments in history this awareness has led Hispanic intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic to call for a joining of forces, a pan-national coalition to withstand the attacks of Anglo-Saxon modernity. This coalition has been seen as a means not only of preserving the integrity of a set of moral values, a cultural heritage, and a way of life, but also of actively promoting them as a global alternative to the invasive barbarism of the North (Litvak 1990: 156). Latin American intellectuals have tended to propose either wide Trans-Atlantic alliances of all Latin nations including France and Italy, or more narrow ones limited to Spanish America. Spanish intellectuals, by contrast, have been strongly attracted by the idea of a specifically Pan-Hispanic cultural commonwealth with the old *Madre Patria* at its centre. In the turbulent 1920s and 1930s, the enthusiasm for this last type of Pan-Hispanism also grew among many right-wing Latin Americans, who saw it as a welcome bulwark against communism and democracy (Schuler 1998: 57). At around the same time, the advent of the Second Spanish Republic (1931) sparked expectations among intellectuals of the Latin American left about the possibility of a progressive Pan-Hispanic front to stop fascism in its tracks (Schuler 1998: 56; Falcoff and Pike 1982).

Their divergent political orientations notwithstanding, all of these pan-nationalist dreams shared a number of important characteristics. For one, they were all anti-Anglo. Second, they manifested a basic uneasiness with modernity, or at least with modernity as it was being exported – and, they felt, imposed on them – by the hegemonic North since the late nineteenth century. But perhaps the most common element in these discourses was the view that Hispanic or Latin culture embodied an appreciation for the *spiritual* in which US, English, Dutch or German culture – Protestant, materialist and utilitarian – were thought to be wholly lacking. In this essay I would like to address the invocation of this supposed spirituality in the celebrations of Pan-Hispanist unity by Spanish intellectuals who were exiled to Latin America after the defeat of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). My argument will be that, by insisting on the

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importance of this spiritual aspect, Spanish liberal and left-wing intellectuals introduced a treacherous idealist element into their discourse – an element whose ideological implications clashed with their otherwise quite progressive ideas on their relationship, as intellectuals, to the ‘people’ or ‘masses’, to national culture, and to political involvement generally. This idealism manifested itself concretely in such intellectuals’ tendency to value ideas and ideals (the non-material and non-physical) over the material and the physical, thus fetishizing their own role and social status as guardians of ‘culture’. Moreover, we will see that the concept of Hispanic spirituality was closely associated with notions of disinterestedness, sacrifice, and altruism, as well as a fundamental ‘humanism’ presumed to be especially well represented in Hispanic culture. After all, the argument went, contrary to the more materialistic Northern cultures, Spaniards had always believed in the centrality of the particular human being.

Tracing the genealogy of the peculiar but persistent claim that Hispanic culture is characterized by a unique concern with the spiritual and that its intelligentsia is exceptionally well equipped to develop and defend this spirituality, I will try to show how the idealist substratum of Pan-Hispanism stands in direct contradiction to the political agenda of the Popular Front – an agenda to which the exiled intellectuals, with a greater or lesser degree of conviction, had committed themselves *en masse* in the 1930s. Indeed, I will argue that, for certain sections of the Spanish left, Pan-Hispanist idealism provided a way out of their Gramscian, Popular-Frontist commitment to emancipatory politics, paving a retreat back to the more elitist and detached positions propagated by, among others, the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. For many, this way out was not unwelcome after 1939, given their disenchantment with party politics, the inviability of the Republican project under Cold War conditions, and the inevitable isolation and alienation of exile. Also, it needs to be remembered that the Popular Front was anything but a harmonious or monolithic whole, and that the intellectuals associated with it were not necessarily all politically radical.

Northern representations of Hispanic culture

In 1943 Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, a Republican Spanish medievalist exiled to Argentina, expressed the hope that one day, at last, Spain’s noble historical accomplishments would be recognized for what they were. ‘Pasan los pueblos y los Imperios,’ he wrote. ‘Sobreviven más allá de la muerte los que han sabido ser generosos de sí mismos, [...] y luchar y morir por una noble causa.’ Unfortunately:

> Para ellos no han soplado siempre favorables los vientos de la Historia cercana a sus hazañas, que suele ser trazada por sus enemigos vencedores. Pero, a la postre, el peso de los siglos acaba por hacer justicia a sus servicios y por elevarlos a las cumbres de las naciones próceres.

> Y aludo al escribir estas líneas a España, mi patria. [....] No es éste el lugar de hablar de su crédito gigantesco con la humanidad, ni de su gigantesco sacrificio [...], pero en la lucha de la razón frente al espíritu se convirtió en paladín de éste y tuvimos, como suele decirse, mala prensa. (1943: 37-8)

Conspiracy theories aside, there is a certain truth to this. Hispanic nations, particularly Spain itself, have undoubtedly had a bad rap among historians from the non-Spanish West (Álvarez Junco and Shubert 2000: 1; Gibson 1971; Powell 1971; Ingalls 1971; Crichfield 1971). The fact is that, ever since the Enlightenment, the English, Dutch, Germans, Americans and, to a lesser extent, the French and Italians have chosen Spain and its colonies as a convenient 'constitutive other' through which to define themselves – though it should be noted that these definitions have been constructed in both positive and negative terms. Hispanic culture, to be sure, was generally ignored or vilified; but for precisely that same reason it was also an easy object of exoticization. While, for the hegemonic forces of the North, 'backward', cruel, and intolerant Hispanic culture served to emphasize their own progress, humanity, and civilization, oppositional movements have been prone to project their premodern utopias onto the largely unknown – and consequently mysterious – regions south of the Pyrenees and the Río Grande. This is true not only for the North European Romantics, but also for the US 'Southern Agrarians' and for the thousands of volunteers who went to Spain in the late 1930s to help fight the Civil War, to name but a few examples (Praz 1929: 11-17; Pike 1992: 198; Hopkins 1998: xv; Coombes 1989: 72).

Self-representations of Hispanic culture

The reactions of Hispanic intellectuals to these representations imposed on them from abroad can be roughly classified in two basic categories. Some accepted and internalized the Northern reading of their nations as backward and inferior; others reacted in a much more defensive fashion, vindicating their cultural difference from, and even superiority to, Anglo-Saxon modernity. As mentioned above, many of these cultural defences postulated a Pan-Latin, Pan-Latin-American or Pan-Hispanic unity founded on a shared cultural heritage and 'spiritual' outlook on life. The idea that the former Spanish empire continued to exist – or could be resurrected – in the shape of a pan-national cultural commonwealth had fascinated sections of the Spanish intelligentsia ever since the independence of the Spanish-American colonies (Pike 1971: 1-3; Van Aken 1959). Under the influence, first, of Romantic cultural nationalism and, later, positivist theories on race, nineteenth-century Europe had seen the emergence of several such pan-nationalist movements, including Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and Pan-Teutonism (Litvak 1990: 156-7). It was not until the 1870s, however, that the idea of a great Latin or Hispanic 'race' gained wide currency. This idea was based on the belief that Latin nations shared not only a set of genetic and cultural characteristics but, more importantly, a common historical destiny. As

Litvak explains, this way of thinking emerged primarily as a reaction to what seemed to be a general decadence of Latin nations in relation to their German and Anglo-Saxon competitors – who, for their part, were quick to attribute their relative success to a supposed racial superiority (1990: 157).

In this process, three military defeats severely shook Latin self-confidence: that of France to Germany in 1870, that of Italy to Ethiopia in 1896, and finally the seemingly effortless victory of the United States over Spain in 1898. Added to the obvious fact that the North was modernizing far more rapidly than the South and embarking on a new imperialist race from which Spain and Portugal were largely excluded, these defeats sparked a long series of treatises attempting 'scientifically' to explain the shift in the international balance of power (Hobsbawm 1989: 57). At first, in the 1870s, optimism prevailed as Spanish, French, and Italian intellectuals defended themselves against Anglo-Saxon and German claims to superiority. But, as the century drew to a close, the analyses became increasingly sombre and accepting of Latin inferiority (Litvak 1990: 164). In reality, Michael Aronna argues, the fact that Latin intellectuals began to see their own nations as sick, mentally ill, or genetically flawed showed to what degree they had internalized the ideological justifications of late nineteenth-century imperialism (1999: 11-12).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a new optimism emerged as intellectuals claimed to see clear signs of Anglo-Saxon decadence and an imminent Latin renaissance. True, they admitted, Latin countries appeared to lag behind their Northern neighbours; in reality, however, they were more advanced than the latter and, in the end, they would come out winning. The Germanic and Anglo-Saxon nations might be making tremendous material progress but, since they lacked the innate spirituality of the Latin peoples, their advance was artificial, one-sided, and bound to blow up in their faces. To Spanish and Spanish American writers the signs of decay were evident. The Americans, especially, were considered to be morally corrupt, greedy, criminal, and lacking any sense of the aesthetic (Litvak 1990: 172). In his many chronicles written from his exile in the United States during the 1880s and 90s, José Martí had been enthusiastic about US democracy but ambivalent, to say the least, about the changing role of women and the 'culto desmedido a la riqueza' he believed was obsessing North-American society (1963: 335). Similar arguments were put forward by Ángel Ganivet in his *Idearium español* (1897). Compared to Spain's former colonies, Ganivet stated, the development of the United States was fast but not organic. Consequently, he predicted, its hegemony would not last (1990: 128-9). The claim that the material success of Anglo-Saxon culture was achieved at the cost of essential human values would also be the foundation of José Enrique Rodó's *Ariel* (1900).

Hispanic intellectuals such as Martí, Rodó, Ganivet, Costa, and Vasconcelos saw the history of the modern world mainly as a struggle for hegemony between two great racial or cultural blocks. While they admitted that one could not exist without the other, they also emphasized that, naturally, Hispanic culture was superior to that of the Anglo-Saxons. Rodó recognized the importance of North

America's 'material' progress, but he maintained that it could ultimately not be more than the basis on which to build a 'spiritual' civilization, the heritage of which was embodied by the Latin peoples (1976: 22). To avoid the danger of unilateral development, then, the Hispanic block had to be strengthened, for the sake of balance. A victory of Anglo-Saxon culture over its Latin or Hispanic rival would disturb a harmonious equilibrium and be a great loss to humanity as a whole. According to Joaquín Costa, the most prominent representative of Spanish turn-of-the-century 'regenerationism', the world needed 'una raza española grande y poderosa, contrapuesta a la raza sajona, para restablecer el equilibrio moral en el juego infinito de la historia'. Next to the British Sancho Panza, Costa predicted, we would soon see emerging a luminous Spanish Don Quijote (cited in Litvak 1990: 179). In *La raza cósmica* (1925), the Mexican intellectual José Vasconcelos would similarly speak of the relation between Spanish Americans and Anglo-Saxons as one of intense competition; and, although he cannot help but admire the achievements of the 'common enemy', he urges Spanish Americans to stop quarrelling because their divisiveness serves only to benefit their cultural rivals (1976: 49-51, 57).

Pan-Hispanism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

As we have seen, then, Pan-Hispanism or *hispanismo* peaked in popularity at the end of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. Spain's defeat in 1898 convinced Spanish Americans that, if there was any threat to their political independence, it was going to come from the United States and not, as had been feared until then, from Spain. The result was that Spain appeared now as an attractive cultural or 'spiritual' ally in the defence against the colossus of the North. In his seminal study on *hispanismo,* Pike defines the phenomenon as 'the unassailable faith in the existence of a transatlantic Hispanic family, community, or *raza*'. *Hispanismo*, he explains, fundamentally rests on two premises: first, 'the conviction that through the course of history Spaniards have developed a life style and culture, a set of characteristics, traditions, and value judgements that render them distinct from all other peoples'; and, second, that through their conquest of the American continent they succeeded in imbuing the colonized peoples with precisely the same cultural idiosyncrasies (1971: 1).

Hispanismo is, indeed, a common theme in the scores of treatises on Spain's decadence and need for regeneration written and published at the turn of the century. Some members of the so-called literary 'Generation of 1898' also revealed themselves as enthusiastic *hispanistas*. Ganivet, cited above, declared that 'la conservación de nuestra supremacía ideal sobre los pueblos que por nosotros nacieron a la vida, es algo más noble y transcendental que la construcción de una red de ferrocarriles' (1990: 132-3). Miguel de Unamuno, who published very regularly in Spanish American newspapers, particularly in *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, wrote that the Spanish language was 'la base de nuestra patria espiritual: y hasta nuestros días Cervantes es quien nos da mayores derechos de posesión sobre América que el mismo Colón les dió a nuestros ancestros' (cited in Pérez Montfort 1990: 10). Later, from the 1920s on, Ramiro

de Maeztu would become the undisputed defender of *hispanidad*, a Catholic, neo-imperial, and reactionary version of *hispanismo* that would become one of the ideological foundations of the Franco regime (Morodo 1985).

The mention of Francoist *hispanidad* leads us to an important point. Pan-Hispanism, like most nationalisms, cannot be identified with a single political movement. Rather, it constitutes a space to be conquered, an ideological battleground to which different political factions have tried to lay claim, some with more success than others. The fact is that, since the late nineteenth century, the idea of a post-imperial reunion of Spain and its former colonies has been adopted by a number of different groups with very divergent political agendas. Thus, while some have aimed to reinstate nothing less than the former colonial empire – albeit on a cultural or 'spiritual' level – on the basis of a militant Catholicism, a hierarchical and militarized social structure, and under strong leadership from Spain, others have proposed a loosely defined cultural commonwealth founded on liberal, democratic, or even radical left-wing principles. A second point to emphasize is that *hispanismo* is still alive and well. As María Escudero has shown, even the foreign policies of post-Francoist Spain are partly based on a form of Pan-Hispanism, inasmuch as they assume the unity of the Spanish-speaking world and tend to attribute to Spain the 'mission' of representing that world – for example, to Europe (Escudero 1996).

In his study of manifestations of *hispanismo* between 1898 and 1936, Pike distinguishes a 'liberal' and a 'conservative' strand. The latter's main points of emphasis were Catholicism, traditionalism, social hierarchy, and a clear subordination of the former colonies to the moral and cultural authority of the *Madre Patria*. Liberal *hispanismo*, by contrast, assumed a more equal relationship between Spain and Spanish America and did not see Catholicism as a defining characteristic. Still, for Pike, both the liberal and conservative strands of *hispanismo* are 'rightist': ultimately, he argues, both were apprehensive about democracy and both sought to preserve social peace by emphasizing the importance of hierarchy (1971: 5). As has been mentioned, starting in the 1920s, right-wing *hispanismo* developed into a fully-fledged cultural or 'spiritual' neo-imperialism that was enthusiastically embraced by Catholic traditionalists and fascist Falangistas on both sides of the Atlantic (Pérez Montfort 1990). But the 1930s also witnessed the emergence of a more truly left-wing version of *hispanismo*, as progressive forces on both sides of the Atlantic discovered their common anti-fascist objectives. This progressive *hispanismo* would not fully blossom until after the Spanish Civil War, when a great number of Spanish intellectuals found themselves exiled in Spanish America, where they were happy and surprised not only to find refuge and political solidarity, but also to rediscover a forgotten part of their Hispanic identity.

Pan-Hispanism in exile discourse

There is no doubt that this sense of rediscovery was felt strongest by the many Spanish intellectuals who were exiled to the revolutionary Mexico of Lázaro Cárdenas. For Spain and Mexico, the arrival of tens of thousands of Spanish

Civil War refugees, starting in 1938 and continuing through the 1940s, was the most important moment of mutual contact and influence since Mexican independence. Intellectuals on both sides described it as an eye-opening experience. In fact, as Schuler (1998) and Powell (1981) show, this rapprochement was the result of a process that had begun much earlier. For some decades prior to 1939, Spain had become for post-revolutionary Mexico, and for Latin America as a whole, something of a political mirror image in which both conservative and progressive groups saw their objectives alternately being threatened or realized. After the revolutionary turmoil of 1910-20, many conservative Mexicans looked back in nostalgia toward the stable social order of the post-Independence period or even colonial rule, where Church and State had not yet been separated and social hierarchies were respected. As mentioned earlier, this nostalgia for order spurred an *hispanista* exaltation of 'Spanish' cultural and political values (Schuler 1998: 57). On the other side of the political spectrum, progressive forces in Latin America started out from a very similar premise, with the difference that they pinned their hopes on Spanish liberal and left-wing movements. Thus, the ousting of the Spanish king in 1931 and the abolition of monarchy were celebrated by them as a triumph. Specifically in Mexico, Schuler writes, 'revolutionary politicians felt a special kinship for the Second Spanish Republic' (1998: 56), with which it appeared to share many concerns, such as agrarian reform, social justice, and separation of Church and state. So when, in July 1936, part of the Spanish military rose against the recently elected Popular Front government, President Lázaro Cárdenas did not hesitate to side with the Republic, sending arms to Spain and defending the Republican cause at the League of Nations. Moreover, when it became clear that the Republican cause was doomed, the Mexican president opened the nation's doors to an unlimited number of Spanish refugees, provided that the cost of their transport and accommodation be carried by the Republican authorities (Fagen 1975: 35-6). In total, between 15,000 and 30,000 Spaniards took up this offer.

For the demoralized Republican soldiers and intellectuals and their families, Mexico suddenly emerged as a promised land. They had just suffered a humiliating, inglorious and infuriating defeat, due as much to their own ferocious infighting as to the British, American, and French refusal to side with the Republic. Many refugees had initially been interned in concentration camps shabbily set up by an unsympathetic French government. All were fully aware that their escape had been a narrow one: Europe was being drawn into war and, as it soon turned out, Vichy France was all too eager to extradite Spanish refugees to Francoist Spain. Moreover, few countries were willing to grant the Spanish Republicans refuge. In the international context of the late 1930s and early 1940s, Cárdenas' gesture was one of unparalleled generosity.

Cárdenas had justified his decision to the Mexican public by saying that the Spaniards would not be a burden on the national economy nor a source of social tension. Their cultural and linguistic affinity with Mexico, he argued, would make for a smooth and problem-free integration (Fagen 1975: 36). And, indeed, for the Spanish intellectuals – many of whom knew very little about Mexico prior

to their arrival – the physical contact with the former colony produced a renewed awareness of the Hispanic world as a linguistic, historical, and cultural unity. Animated, moreover, by the declarations of solidarity from the Mexican government and prominent union leaders such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano (Matesanz 1999: 55-8), some exiles went so far as to postulate something of a Pan-Hispanic political front embodying the values of the Spanish Republic. In this way, for the exiled intellectuals, awareness of Hispanic unity quickly became a source of hope. If the whole Hispanic world fought for the same political cause, then the Civil War was reduced to one lost battle in a much greater war that could still be won. Moreover, the idea that Spain and its former colonies formed one cultural unity also helped mitigate possible conflicts of loyalty. It allowed the exiles to swear allegiance to Mexico without feeling they were betraying Spain.

Searching for a discourse to express their new-found sense of pan-nationalist solidarity, the Spaniards reverted back to turn-of-the-century *hispanismo*. Thus, to avoid the impression that they were postulating any sort of political dominion of Spain over its former colonies, they emphasized the fact that the unity of the Hispanic world was of a *spiritual* kind. When, shortly after their arrival, a group of young Spanish intellectuals launched a cultural magazine entitled *Romance* (1940-41), the editors of an information bulletin for Spanish refugees wrote that the journal was 'hija [...] de la fusión en un solo tronco espiritual' of Spanish and Mexican writers, a fusion which was made possible by 'la previa unidad que impone la lengua común', the generosity of the Mexicans, and the impulse of the Spaniards. 'Somos unos para la cultura mexicanos y españoles, porque hablamos la misma lengua', the editorial stated (cited in Caudet 1992: 124). The editorials of *Romance* itself, too, celebrated the 'spiritual' kinship of Spaniards and Latin Americans. The editors signalled the dawn of a new unity of Spanish-speaking America: 'Esa unión entrañable de los pueblos americanos [....] [e]s un vivo y ardiente deseo que se oye latir por todo el continente' (*Romance* 1940b: 7). In fact, they wrote, 'millones de hombres de habla española sienten hoy en América que su cultura, [...] es ya una realidad palpable que no ha logrado sin embargo aún, en el mundo, alcanzar el respeto debido; y sienten que esta cultura tiene ante sí un futuro inmenso' (*Romance* 1940a: 7).

One of the obstacles that these Pan-Hispanist longings encountered was, of course, Mexican nationalism, which preferred to celebrate the indigenous heritage over that of the Peninsular colonizers. The editors of *Romance* responded to these anti-Spanish attitudes by partly adopting them themselves, and by explicitly distancing themselves both from Spain's imperial past and from the *gachupines* – the economic immigrants whose presence in Mexico was not looked well upon by public opinion. The Republican exiles, by contrast, emphatically declared that they had not come to the Americas to become rich. Instead, they had come to work together with the Mexicans. What is more, the editors wrote, 'odian tanto, y por las mismas razones que los americanos, a esa España negra y nefasta, cruel, contra la que han luchado de 1936 a 1939 como hace más de un siglo lucharon los americanos' (*Romance* 1940c: 7).

The most elaborate theorization of the profound bonds uniting Spain and

Spanish America was laid out by surrealist poet Juan Larrea in the exile journal *España Peregrina* (1940-41). Larrea, something of a modern mystic, combined an exceptionalist reading of Spanish history with a utopian vision of the American continent and a Spenglerian vision of Europe. In Larrea's view, Europe was succumbing to its own so-called civilization, the decadence of which had been exemplified by the 'betrayal' of the Spanish Republic by the great Western democracies and by the outbreak of the Second World War. But according to Larrea the 'death' of the Republic, however tragic, inaugurated a new phase in history in which the cultural hegemony of Europe would be replaced by that of the Americas. In this historical transition, Larrea believed, the Spanish exiles were to play a crucial role. As the 'soul' of the deceased Republic, they were destined to carry Europe's, and particularly Spain's, spiritual essence across the Atlantic toward the promised land of the future. Thanks to these Spaniards, then, European or Spanish civilization would be allowed to resurrect on the American continent or, in Larrea's terms, 'el continente del espíritu', 'llamado a equilibrar a los otros dos grandes bloques continentales del mundo antiguo: Asia-Oceanía y Europa-Africa'. According to Larrea, the historic role of '[e]l pueblo español inmolado' was to facilitate access to 'ese mundo de civilización verdadera' by being 'su precursor efectivo e indispensable' (Larrea 1940: 23). In another later article, he claimed that the exiles were 'la emanación del alma española'. They were, he wrote in an editorial:

> la semilla de una organización humana más profunda [...] lanzada por España, como síntesis de la experiencia occidental, a estas tierras feraces de América donde se habla nuestro mismo idioma y desde donde habrá de irradiar sobre la Península y sobre el mundo entero. (*España Peregrina* 1940a: 149)

The same editorial stated that the world 'precisa, para desarrollarse, aquellos principios superiores, aquellos gérmenes que palpitaban pacífica y virilmente en el corazón de España' (*España Peregrina* 1940a: 147). The Spanish *pueblo*, Larrea maintained elsewhere, had an innate belief in 'algo superior al egoísmo individual', in 'la existencia de un más allá de orden más noble, complejo y elevado', and in 'el derecho inalienable [...] para dirigirse libremente hacia un porvenir superior por las sendas de la justicia y del progreso' (*España Peregrina* 1940b: 244).

Larrea's idealist rhetoric was exceptionally strong, but he was not the only one to define Spanish identity in spiritual terms and on the basis of an exceptionalist reading of Spanish history. In fact, as I have shown in more detail elsewhere, between 1939 and 1953 a considerable number of intellectuals of different political persuasions wrote essays in defence of Spanish culture (Faber 2001: 533-4). Most of them argued along very similar lines, departing from two basic presuppositions: that rationalist, Western modernity was going through a life-threatening crisis, and that Spain's position vis-à-vis that modernity had always been oppositional or marginal. This led them to two conclusions: first, that Spain was free of blame with regard to the crisis of the West and, second,

that Spain, whose particular character and steadfast adherence to 'spiritual' (that is, anti-modern) values had been constant since the sixteenth century, might very well present itself as the world's spiritual guide, providing it with a way out of its terrible malaise.

For example, when distinguished philologist Américo Castro accepted an endowed chair at Princeton University in December 1940, he gave an inaugural lecture on 'the meaning of Spanish civilization', which stated, somewhat triumphantly, that the West's 'illusory faith in reason' had finally collapsed and that, therefore, 'the Spanish way of life needs less than ever before to offer excuses for being as it is' (1940: 11). Since the 'principal Spanish theme has always been Man as a naked and absolute reality,' Castro argued, 'any contact with Spanish civilization will pave the way for a new and fruitful Humanism' (1940: 10-11, 29). Similar arguments were advanced by María Zambrano, for whom Spain was 'el tesoro virginal dejado atrás en la crisis del racionalismo europeo' (1939: 26); by José Gaos, who argued that, now that Western modernity had lost its prestige, Spain's proverbial decadence appeared as a fundamental form of *dissidence* (1957: 402); and especially by Francisco Ayala, who dedicated a whole book to the matter. In *Razón del mundo,* whose first edition appeared in 1944, Ayala characterized Western modernity as a 'proceso disociador' with which Spain, and by extension the whole Hispanic world, had always been radically at odds. Through centuries of stubborn resistance to this 'technical' form of modernity, Spain had been able to preserve its 'básica estructura cultural', characterized by an 'impregnación cultural católica, es decir: ecuménica, universalista-humana' (1962: 116). The fact that Spain had never allowed anything to prevail above 'la causa del espíritu', Ayala argued, now endowed Spain and its former colonies with 'una autoridad incomparable': the Hispanic world would be able to provide the rest of the globe with nothing less than 'las bases culturales para su futuro despliegue histórico' (1962: 114-15).

In spite of its progressive intents, it is obvious that the Republicans' *hispanismo* did not fully succeed in distinguishing itself from the reactionary, traditionalist conception of *hispanidad* as propagated by Francoist ideologues, who glorified Hispanic spirituality together with notions of empire, hierarchy, and Catholic dogma (Morodo 1985). At around the same time that Larrea, Gaos, Zambrano, Ayala and others expressed their hope that Spain would somehow emerge as the moral or spiritual saviour of the entire Western world, both the traditionalist and more radical Falangist factions of the Franco regime expressed themselves in almost identical terms. Rafael Calvo Serer, for instance, wrote in *España sin problema* (1949) that Spain's tradition, 'fiel al espíritu creador del Cristianismo', had now turned the nation into 'una esperanza de valor universal'. Rejecting both capitalism and communism, Calvo Serer believed Spain had an extraordinary opportunity again to become an 'actor principal en la historia de Occidente', replacing 'a la Europa racionalista y marxista por una nueva Cristiandad, en la que España ha de tener un papel rector en el mundo del espíritu' (cited in Morán 1998: 250).

The exiles' language and symbolism are uncomfortably close to this

Francoist rhetoric, and the same holds true for the exiles' attempts at international vindication of Spain's historical and cultural role in terms of its resistance to modern materialism. In both the Francoist and exiles' account of Spain's cultural heritage one perceives a frustration with what, on both sides, is perceived as a nagging injustice: the failure of the world to recognize Spain's contribution to human civilization. In both there is a nationalist sentiment of hostility toward Spain's historical rivals in politics and religion: mostly England and, by extension, the United States. In both Francoist nationalism and that of the exiles, moreover, this hostility is related to a rejection of the hegemony of a modernity presumed to be imposed from abroad. This is not necessarily a rejection of modernity as such, but of the currently hegemonic modernity, which is, again, primarily identified by both with the Anglo-Saxon nations. And, as we saw earlier, both set their hopes on an alternative modernity (anti-capitalist or anti-communist, or both), a modernity more worthy of humankind, based on a set of superior values which, as both sides claim, are most clearly represented in Hispanic history and culture.

Here one point should be made clear: when I signal correspondences between the cultural nationalism or *hispanismo* of the Republicans and some basic tenets of Francoist ideology, it is not my intention to trivialize or justify the Franco dictatorship. Rhetorical similarities of course do not imply that the two sides' *practices* were equally reprehensible. The Franco dictatorship's nationalist mythologies and its ideology of *hispanidad* served to legitimize a violently repressive regime which mercilessly sought to eliminate all political opposition – an enterprise in which it unfortunately succeeded to a great degree. The *hispanismo* of the exiles, on the other hand, was an attempt ideologically to ground an oppositional, anti-fascist, democratic stance in response to the trauma of defeat and expatriation.

In fact, it is in the definition of the presumably 'authentic' Hispanic values that the two sides widely diverge. Francoism rejects Anglo-Saxon modernity insofar as it embodies the intellectual and political values of the Enlightenment, secularism, and the French revolution; what it proposes instead is a reactionary hotchpotch of Catholicism, social hierarchy, and a highly mythified image of the Middle Ages. In essence, then, Francoist ideology is profoundly anti-modern: isolationist, regressive, irrationalist, and reactionary. The Republicans, by contrast, do not reject modernity in itself. If they are critical of its Anglo-Saxon variant, it is because they consider its capitalism and imperialism as expressions of a basic anti-humanist attitude; for them, a Hispanic modernity would be more human, more 'cultural', less unjust. And while Francoism accuses the Republicans of siding with the 'foreign' ideologies of liberalism or communism, the Republicans charge the Franco regime with 'selling out', first, to Italian and German fascism and, after 1950, to North American capitalism. 'Por treinta dineros vende ahora Franco la propia metrópoli,' Republican exile Max Aub wrote in 1951 when the United States had initiated negotiations with Franco which would result in the establishment of US military bases on Spanish territory. 'No le bastó regar de sangre española la tierra española: tenía que

vender el suelo empapado' (1967: 73-4).

Hispanismo as cultural nationalism

Still, regardless of their political orientation, there are a series of motifs that seem to recur in most if not all forms of Pan-Hispanism. The first one of these is, of course, the idea that there actually exists something like a uniquely Spanish culture and way of life which is shared by the inhabitants of Spain's former colonies. Though all attach great importance to the Spanish language as a unifying element (Pérez Montfort 1990: 10), *hispanistas* differ on how this shared culture has been formed and what exactly it entails.[2] Some postulate an 'eternal' Spanishness going back to pre-Roman times (Menéndez Pidal 1963), while others designate a very specific set of historical circumstances as the source of Spanish identity (Castro 1948; Ganivet 1990). Another bone of contention is the relative share the Americas have had in this common Trans-Atlantic character. Here, one can say that the more liberal or progressive the *hispanismo*, the more it is willing to concede a decisive role to Spanish America – or even the American indigenous cultures – in Hispanic identity formation (Pérez Montfort 1990: 8-11).[3] Even so, all tend to presuppose, though some less explicitly than others, some form of Spanish tutelage over its former colonies (Pérez Montfort 1990: 10-11).

Closely linked to the idea of a unified Hispanic identity is the concept of historical destiny or 'mission'. Spain's unique character, the argument goes, has destined it for a specific kind of future and a specific role in the history of humanity as a whole. Most left- and right-wing *hispanistas* see the discovery, conquest and conversion of the Americas as an integral part of this mission, even though, as we saw above, the progressive *hispanistas* feel that they should 'rectify' part of Spain's colonial history, particularly where the repression of indigenous cultures is concerned (Pérez Montfort 1990: 11). Similarly, even though all *hispanistas* offer an exceptionalist reading of Spanish history, they differ widely on what they choose to highlight as proof of Spain's unique contribution to the history of mankind – its Catholicism or its Humanism; the conversion of the indigenous Americans or their defence, taken up by Bartolomé de las Casas and others, on the basis of some idea of the Universal Rights of Man; Spain's brave stand, in 1936, against the godless hordes of communism or, conversely, its courageous position at the forefront of anti-fascism.

Four important ideas are implicit in this concept of an identity-related mission or destiny. First, it is presupposed that, ever since the Conquest, this destiny is *shared* by Spain and its former colonies. Second, this destiny is not seen as inexorable: it can be either heeded or betrayed; it can be realized or thwarted. As has been noted above, Pan-Hispanist nationalism is not a defined political programme but rather a space open to contention; thus, if to one group of *hispanistas*, socialism is a betrayal of 'true' Hispanic character and destiny while fascism most perfectly embodies it, to another it is precisely the other way around.

The third idea implicit in that of a trans-national destiny is that Spain and

Spanish America will not recover from their 'decadence' until they realize that they share not only a common past but also a common future. For practically all *hispanistas*, Hispanic decadence is due to a double misunderstanding – the non-Hispanic world has misunderstood and misrepresented the true role and accomplishments of Spain and its colonies; but, more importantly, the Hispanic nations have themselves been misled about their character and, thus, about which road to follow toward progress. True self-knowledge is seen as an essential step to Hispanic recuperation; and, *hispanistas* argue, neither Spain nor Spanish America can reach this knowledge in isolation (Pike 1971: 1). Whence, too, the condemnation of any Spanish American tendency to look for its models or allies elsewhere – in the United States, France, or England – as a form of 'going astray' or, worse still, of siding with the 'enemy' (Litvak 1990: 187; Pérez Montfort 1990: 8).

In the fourth place, *hispanistas* are convinced that, once the Hispanic world has discovered its true character and has become aware of its shared destiny, it will regain its position of global leadership. *Hispanistas* from left and right coincide in their optimism regarding this renewed pan-national glory. They also coincide in rejecting the idea of political domination; rather, the Hispanic world will emerge as the *moral* or, again, the *spiritual* guide to the rest of humanity.

A quick glance across Spain's borders shows that most of the elements I have just listed as characteristic of Pan-Hispanism – national character, destiny, exceptionalism, plus promises of (pan-)national glory to come – are in no way unique to it. In fact they are the stock ingredients of what has come to be known as 'cultural nationalism', a phenomenon which can be directly related to the thought of Fichte and Hegel and, specifically, to Herderian cultural relativism (Hutchinson 1990: 122-3). In Spain, the concepts of cultural nationalism fully entered the public sphere in the form of nineteenth-century 'national histories' (Fox 1997), were taken up and strengthened at the turn of the century, especially by the members of the so-called Generation of 1898, and from there found their way into the discourse of the Republican exiles in Spanish America (Faber 2001). Cultural nationalism, then, is hard to eradicate; it is an irresistible ideological life saver whenever group identity and collective self-confidence are being threatened – which was of course the case for both Francoist Spain and the Republican exile community.

Hispanic 'spirituality': A genealogy

As said, the key feature of *hispanismo* is its representation of the Hispanic world as a bastion of spirituality in an increasingly materialist world. The most common metaphor invoked here is that of a reserve, a treasure, a mine or a trove: Spain is represented as a protected area in which a precious part of the past has been kept intact for future use. As we have seen, though, this same idea of Spain as a spiritual reserve of the West has been given widely divergent, sometimes directly opposing contexts. Reactionary interpretations of Hispanic spirituality equate it directly with Catholic orthodoxy. For Catholic intellectuals such as Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo and Ramiro de Maeztu, spirituality was a weapon against the

bastard sons of the Enlightenment – rationalism, positivism, communism, democracy, and capitalism, all of which, they contended, celebrated or exploited the base animal passions of man and were a threat to social hierarchy. For the Falangists, spirituality was also a weapon in the fight against communism and liberalism in favour of authoritarianism. To turn-of-the-century reformers such as Ángel Ganivet, turned off by the excesses of Northern industrial capitalism, Hispanic spirituality provided the basis of a pre-modern utopia of small farmers and artisans. For communists and socialists, finally, 'spirituality' was mobilized against both the anti-human, alienating values of capitalism and the repressive, authoritarian, and violent 'barbarism' of the fascists.

Why did the Spanish left end up expressing its political goals in a language so suffused with idealist rhetoric? Part of the explanation can be found in its nineteenth-century cultural-nationalist undercurrent. But it is also important to take into account the specific historical development of liberal and left-wing thought in Spain. As Carlos Blanco Aguinaga has argued, the Spanish bourgeoisie, historically weak in comparison to its Northern counterparts, was never able to shed the idealist heritage imposed on it by the lingering ideology of the landed nobility, Church, and army, for whom Spain's character, values, and greatness were defined by its steadfast belief in the superiority of 'idea' over 'matter' (1998: 46-7). In the course of the nineteenth century, this ideology affected not only those sections of the bourgeoisie that specifically aligned themselves with the traditional power bloc, but also the liberal opposition for which, after 1876, the Krausist Institución Libre de Enseñanza would provide a base. Moreover, as Blanco Aguinaga explains, the most salient feature of Spanish liberals' pervasive idealism lies not only in this presumption of the intrinsic superiority of spirituality over materialism, but also in the fact that they tended to view Spain's problems and identity exclusively in 'spiritual' terms:

> el conflicto España-Europa, en el que se confunden ambiciones (o necesidades) económico-políticas (la 'materia') y valores espirituales, suele presentársenos como si fuera exclusivamente un conflicto de valores, limpio y puro de toda contaminación material. (1998: 47)

This idealist interpretation of Spanish history, accepted even by Spanish socialists such as Fernando de los Ríos (1926), never really questioned the representation of Spain as a 'paladín del espíritu', to use Sánchez Albornoz's formulation cited at the beginning of this essay. (Indeed, the fact that Sánchez Albornoz calls attention to Spain's 'gigantesco sacrificio' to humanity clearly shows how much this 'spiritualist' liberal discourse owes to the standard conservative-Catholic reading of the Conquest and colonization as Spain's ultimate sacrificial act of disinterestedness and altruism.) In addition, this persistent idealism also explains the tendency of an important part of the Spanish left to see social change primarily in terms of education, a 'revolution from above' led by an enlightened intellectual elite and, ultimately, respectful of social hierarchy.

In this context it is important to remember that, in Spanish intellectual

discourse, the term 'spirituality' – and derivatives such as 'spiritual mission' or 'spiritual kinship' – is almost interchangeable with the term 'culture', which in turn would become of central importance in the anti-fascist discourse of the Popular Front. As Raymond Williams has shown, ever since Romanticism the term 'culture' has suffered from a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, it is something that can be taught and acquired; culture in this sense signifies the cultivation of the mind and its results, which are guarded by the educated. On the other hand, culture is seen, in a Herderian fashion, as a people's innate 'general way of life', residing in its purest form in the common folk (Williams 1983: 87-93). I would argue that the Spanish left's contradictory championing of 'spirituality' or 'culture' can be traced back to this ambiguity.

Like many of the central ideologemes invoked across the political spectrum during the process of political polarization of the 1930s and the Civil War, the Republicans' conception of culture had its roots in the intellectual discourse of the turn of the century and the pedagogical philosophies of *krausismo*. For the Krausists culture meant education, and this was considered to be the most adequate road to national regeneration. At the same time, however, Spain's turn-of-the-century reformers – including the Regenerationist movement and subsequent thinkers like Ganivet and Unamuno – were strongly influenced by the concept of culture as a nation's primordial life force and source of identity, embodied in the *pueblo*. Culture, then, was paradoxically seen as both a *means* and a *source* of national regeneration. In the 1930s, as the Spanish intelligentsia gained a renewed sense of political commitment, 'culture' – retaining both its pedagogical and its populist aspects – again became central to intellectuals' discourse. In addition, however, the concept gained a more explicit political dimension: it was directly identified with the ideals of the left in its struggle against fascism. As such, it was appropriated by democratic, Republican and communist intellectuals alike.

Spirituality as ideological trap

As is well known, the rise of fascism in the 1930s helped to unite the hitherto bitterly divided Western left. In England, the United States, France, and Spain, this unity took the form of a so-called Popular Front, and the Communist International officially adopted the Popular Front as its preferred strategy in the fight against fascism during its Seventh Congress in the summer of 1935. It is also known that this strategy ultimately failed; this was the case even in France and Spain, the only two European countries where a Popular-Front coalition was actually able to win a majority of votes. However, in spite of its lack of success in a narrowly political respect, the Popular Front, as an idea and an ideal, as a discourse and a practice, did have a series of important consequences. This is especially true for the cultural and intellectual field, where there emerged something of a 'cultural front' to accompany its political counterpart (Denning 1996). In fact, as Hobsbawm points out, it was intellectuals who were the first to recognize the dangers inherent in the ideology of the German and Italian regimes; correspondingly, the intelligentsia were 'the first social stratum mobilised en

masse against fascism' (1996: 150). Thus, the international Alliance of Antifascist Intellectuals, founded in 1935 in Paris, united a great variety of political orientations under the slogan of 'the defence of culture', in which culture was defined as the opposite of everything fascism stood for.

Culturally, the 1930s are perhaps the most interesting decade of the twentieth century. The urgency of the antifascist struggle, together with the general sense of political and economic crisis, created an unprecedented desire for societal, and thus cultural, change among wide sectors of the population. In this extraordinary atmosphere, a great number of Western intellectuals joined the working-class cause in the attempt to create a genuinely democratic popular culture. For Spanish intellectuals and for those who went to Spain to fight for the Republic, the Spanish Civil War signalled both the apex and the end of this project of exceptional rapprochement between intellectuals and the masses, between art and politics, spurred on by the ideal of abolishing the division between high and popular culture, and between individual and collective forms of art and literature.

Nevertheless, the Popular-Front discourse, as it was formulated by intellectuals and politicians, contained a fair dose of contradictions. While the constant invocation of the *popular* led to a certain Romantic fetishization of national identity and of the folk as the basis of national culture, the intellectual was presented, simultaneously, as the defender and *creator* of that culture. It is in this same contradictory context that we need to place the attempts undertaken by Spanish intellectuals after the Spanish Civil War to defend the idiosyncrasies of Spanish or Hispanic culture against fascism, against Western capitalism and imperialism or, on a more general level, in the face of the crisis of modernity, by postulating an exceptionally spiritual Spanish national character. In practice, I would argue that this definition of Spanish culture constituted something of an ideological trap. As we have seen in the cases of Larrea and Ayala, it encouraged Spaniards to revert to nineteenth-century stereotypes about the presumed spirituality of Latin cultures as opposed to the materialism of the Anglo-Saxon world. As they invoked these stereotypes, they built their discourse on an ideology that can be characterized only as reactionary; implicitly, they postulated a series of hierarchies – between *pueblo* and intellectuals, between *cultos* and uneducated – that, in the last instance, translated into an Orteguian defence of the social and political status quo, in which political power was to remain in the hands of an intellectual minority.

The spirit-matter dichotomy, after all, draws a sharp distinction between body and soul and, by extension, between the 'high', mental or intellectual aspect of humanity and its 'low', animal, physical or instinctive basis. The former is seen as the motor of progress and civilization; the latter constitutes the constant threat of degeneration and relapse into barbarity. The nineteenth-century tendency to think of nations and other communities as collective 'bodies' made for an easy translation of the spirit-matter dichotomy into social terms. Thus the uneducated masses came to represent the material 'passions' of animal instinct, while the educated elite were thought to embody a 'disinterested', civilized spirituality. Hispanism, as we have seen, projects the dichotomy onto an even

larger, international context, in which the body is represented by the materialist North and the spirit is assumed to have its principal residence in the Hispanic or Latin South. To be sure, within Krausist organicism the material was considered to have its own function and value within the whole (Montero 1995: 125); in the same way, even Rodó and Vasconcelos recognize the importance of the 'materialist' accomplishments of Anglo-Saxon modernity. Nevertheless, neither Rodó and Vasconcelos nor the Krausists are prepared to give up the ultimate superiority of the spiritual. Even during the Spanish Civil War, communist Antonio Sánchez Barbudo wrote in *Hora de España,* the Republic's most important cultural magazine:

> [P]or lo que el fascismo significa, *en el fondo* se opone a la cultura. El comunismo, en cambio, se apoya en el pueblo para encauzar sus aspiraciones liberadoras. Sus objetivos, materiales primero, son luego espirituales, últimos. El fascismo aprisiona y el comunismo libera. El fin del comunismo, *en el fondo*, es la cultura. Y recordar estos fines es nuestro papel de intelectuales en esta hora definitiva. (1937: 73)

Moreover, Pan-Hispanism and Pan-Latinism do not completely rule out the intra-national class aspect of the spirit-matter binary. This becomes clear, for instance, in Rodó, who argues that the uneducated Latin-American masses, who lack an innate aesthetic sense, are especially prone to seduction by the success of US-style materialism (1976: 33). Indeed, Rodó explicitly highlights this class dimension. In much the same way that José Ortega y Gasset would later blame Spanish decadence on its lack of ruling elites and on the 'rebellion of the masses', Rodó argues that democracy, if unchecked, can constitute a serious threat to the continued leadership of the intellectual elite (1976: 24-6). If for Rodó the masses are, so to speak, the 'Anglo-Saxon' element within the nation, the intellectual elite represents the true Latin spirit. How generalized this way of thinking was in turn-of-the-century Spain is illustrated by the fact that it even affected the radical left. In May 1901, the Spanish writer Timoteo Orbe wrote an article in the socialist newspaper *La Lucha de Clases*, published in Bilbao, in which he contrasted the 'materialist' or even 'capitalist' attitude of the British workers with the idealism of their Spanish counterparts. According to Orbe, British workers will gladly sacrifice their principles in exchange for a minor salary increase. Like all Anglo-Saxons, British workers are obsessed with the concrete, whereas Latin workers care more about ideals than about material gain (cited in Litvak 1990: 176-7).

In the end, the Spanish exiles' defence of Hispanic culture, as formulated by various – though not all – exiled intellectuals, presupposed the same essential difference between the spiritual and material realm as the one underlying Rodó's arguments. If the exiles laid claim to the spiritual *as Spaniards* against the dehumanized West, they also did so *as intellectuals* against the rest of the population. In the 1940s and 1950s, this line of thinking led prominent exile intellectuals such as Francisco Ayala and José Gaos to argue for a clear separation of political and intellectual activity. Thus, Ayala's essay 'Para quién

escribimos nosotros' (1949), published in *Cuadernos Americanos*, amounts to a definitive break with the Popular-Front idea of the politicized intellectual in close contact with social life. Ayala's ideal intellectual is an island of reason, an isolated figure committed to nothing but 'pure', depoliticized reflection. In a world which, according to Ayala, 'parece haber eliminado de una vez para siempre el aspecto moral de todas las cuestiones' (1971: 150), the only way open to the intellectual is to withdraw into the pure field of culture. Ayala argues that only a new kind of insular elitism will allow the intellectual to protect himself from the infected environment of the times. Given the general hostility toward writers' 'spiritual' concerns, all they can do is seek each others' company and form a secret society of hermits ('anacoretas').

For liberals and moderate socialists, this definition of intellectual practice as constituting a closed-off, privileged space of disinterested spirituality that should be protected from contamination by all 'interested' concerns (the political, the practical, or the selfish satisfaction of material needs) provided a convenient way out of their previous embrace of Popular-Frontism, awkward from the start. But even among the more radical intellectuals such as Juan Rejano – a card-carrying communist and founder of *Romance* – the defence of Arielist idealism in the name of Hispanic cultural difference fostered an elitist attitude that, in the end, undercut the Popular-Frontist principles they continued to defend in their discourse.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the defence of 'spirituality' in the name of cultural difference easily gains an authoritarian and anti-democratic, or at least elitist, dimension. In late-nineteenth century analyses of Latin 'decadence', a popular explanation given for the backwardness of Latin nations was the fact that their 'natural elites' had failed to take charge, and had thus left their communities without a clear direction to follow (Litvak 1990: 167). Variants of this argument can be found in the writings of Joaquín Costa, Ángel Ganivet, Miguel de Unamuno, and José Ortega y Gasset, who believed Spain could be regenerated only through a 'revolution from above'. But even on the left of the political spectrum, many of whose representatives were instilled with the intellectual heritage of Krausism, it was thought that the emancipation of the working classes amounted, in the first place, to helping them liberate themselves from their innate 'materialism' and, through education, opening their eyes to the 'spiritual values' of culture. In the 1930s, this ideology also seeped into the rhetoric of the Popular Front and the anti-fascist 'defence of culture'. Finally, in exile, the vindication of Spain's cultural heritage in terms of a 'spirituality' threatened with extinction under the hegemony of an excessively 'materialist' modernity of Anglo-Saxon origins undercut the progressive thrust of Republican intellectuals' discourse, going against much the Popular Front had stood for. The Arielist idealization of 'culture' as a superior spiritual realm, of the intellectual as its privileged practitioner and 'defender', and of Spain as its geographical and historical site *par excellence* in effect re-introduced a reactionary, essentializing split between

spirit and matter, intellectual and manual labour, high and popular culture – in short, between intellectuals and the masses.

Notes

[1] Parts of this essay appear in different form in Faber (2002).

[2] While my use of the term *hispanista* here is meant to refer to 'proponents of *hispanismo*', the potential confusion with the meaning of *hispanista*/Hispanist as a scholar of Spanish or Hispanic history and culture is not coincidental. One can argue that the notion of Hispanism stems from an exceptionalist reading of Spain and its colonies rooted in the same cultural nationalism that underlies *hispanismo* as a movement. This is the reason why Raymond Carr refuses to consider himself a Hispanist, as he recently explained in the Spanish newspaper *El País:* 'Odio la palabra *hispanista*, como si un historiador de España tuviera que tener dotes psicológicas, casi espirituales, para penetrar en el alma de España y todo eso. Todo mi esfuerzo ha sido considerar, estudiar España con los mismos métodos que se estudia cualquier otro país importante en Europa' (Juliá 2001).

[3] An example of the liberal *hispanista* attitude is José Gaos, who declared at one point that for him the concept of Spanish America included Spain. He even stated that, in reality, Spain was 'el país *hispanoamericano* que queda por independizarse del común pasado imperial': 'la última colonia de sí misma que queda por hacerse independiente' (Gaos 1980: 129).

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